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By John W. 
d Lela 
Angel and her brothers, Martin and Christophe, are engaged in the mediation of a will controversy, involving the estate of their 
father. They are the only beneficiaries under the will. Five years before the testator's death, he had provided his grandchild 
$50,000 for the down payment on a house. At the time of the payment, he had told his grandchild and Angel, the child's moth-
er, that the money was a gift; nonetheless, he required his grandchild to sign a promissory note for the full amount, saying the 
note was merely a formality to avoid gift taxes. Martin, the executor of the estate, found the promissory note among the testa-
tor's papers and has deducted the full amount due on the note, plus interest, from Angel's one-third share of the estate, giving 
her the note so that she can choose to collect it or not from her own daughter. Angel vehemently objected to her unequal share 
and to the characterization of the payment as a loan. After a heated discussion, the parties ask the mediator for his or her opin-
ion on how the matter would be resolved in court. Both Angel and Martin feel sure they will be vindicated by the mediator; 
Christophe wants the mediator's opinion to guide his own conduct. What should a mediator do, assuming he or she is compe-
tent to give the sort of opinion that is being asked for? 
Anyone who dares to explore the field of informed consent in alternative dispute resolution quickly comes to appreciate the quagmire of differing expert 
viewpoints; of conflicting or silent codes of conduct, 
statutes, and rules; of divergent definitions of processes; 
and of the complexity of the topic generally. This article 
explores only one facet of informed consent: what princi-
ples guide a mediator in responsibly performing the duty 
of ensuring that parties give their informed consent prior 
to a mediator providing an opinion on the merits of a 
question once a mediation is underway. If the mediator 
was chosen because he or she would provide an opinion 
(a former judge, for example) or the parties contracted for 
evaluative mediation, then the analysis here would not 
apply. This article focuses on a mediator giving an evalua-
tion when that was not an agreed-upon service when the 
mediation began. A similar analysis should be applied to 
any neutral performing a "new" service that is importantly 
different from what was expected: an arbitrator, for exam-
ple, who takes on mediation services. There are dangers, in 
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every case, in changing horses midstream. Both as a mat-
ter of responsible practice and to avoid liability, those 
dangers best be known and consciously accepted prior to 
undertaking the move. 
In articulating principles and guidelines, we will have 
to answer: What are the dangers of providing an opinion 
or case evaluation while serving as a mediator? If there 
are dangers, what duties does a mediator have to warn 
parties? What should be said? What is informed consent 
in this context? Additionally, once consent is given, how 
careful must a mediator be in providing an opinion or 
professional advice? 
Before proceeding, we should define what we mean by 
mediator evaluation that would merit warning and informed 
consent. We do not mean reality-testing questions (e.g., 
Have you considered getting legal advice about deducting the 
value of the note from Angel's share of the estate? How do you 
think a judge might view a signed 
note compared to a recollection of a 
verbal statement?). Nor do we 
include mediator role-reversal 
to other situations. For example, if the mediator comes 
from a different professional background (e.g., psychology, 
accounting), rendering evaluations based on expert 
knowledge would require the same treatment. 
The Dangers of Mediator Evaluations 
The benefits of a neutral (particularly expert) evaluation 
may be more intuitively obvious than the dangers. The 
benefits, from a party's perspective, might include enhancing 
the information base for decision making; reality-check-
ing the overconfidence of the other side; using the trusted 
neutral mediator instead of needing to hire another neu-
tral for an evaluation; and bringing public norms ( the 
law) into the conversation to provide an acceptable basis 
for a resolution. 
Those possible benefits must be weighed, however, 
against dangers that may not be as obvious, particularly 
to inexperienced parties. Unsolicited opinions often pro-
voke defensive, even hostile, 
reactions, particularly if the opin-
ion is unfavorable. Even solicited 
strategies to ensure that parties 
understand one another's perspec-
tives and arguments (e.g., Did you 
understand Angel's point about hon-
oring the representations and inten-
tions of your father? Do you 
appreciate that Martin is more per -
suaded by a signed note than by your 
report about a statement made many 
years ago?) Despite an evaluative 
component in these questions, the 
questions call for party evaluation. 
If the mediator's tone is consistent 
with that call-as opposed to a 
tone that asserts a mediator's con-
clusion-such questions do not 
Unsolicited opinions 
often provoke 
defensive, even 
hostile, reactions, 
particularly if the 
opinion is unfavorable. 
opinions can be unwelcome if 
they importantly differ from what 
is expected. Consider the follow-
ing list of potential dangers in 
mediator evaluation: 
• An evaluation might jeopardize 
the actual or perceived neutrality 
of the mediator, which in tum 
jeopardizes a mediator's continued 
usefulness; 
• An evaluation might interfere 
with party self-determination (inso-
far as parties bow to a neutral's 
expertise and opinion rather than 
exercising their own judgment), 
comprise mediator evaluation as 
the term is used here. A facilita-
tive mediator regularly asks for party analysis about appli-
cable law, leads a discussion about the strengths and 
weaknesses of their cases, and probes for alternatives and 
options. Examples of evaluative mediator behavior that 
would require informed consent include: 
• Advising parties about their legal rights and responsi-
bilities by applying legal rules and precedents to the spe-
cific facts of the dispute. (E.g., Angel is not liable on her 
adult daughter's promissory note. The testator's granddaughter 
will probably be found liable on the written promissory note 
despite parole evidence to the contrary.) 
• Offering a personal or professional opinion on how the 
court will resolve the dispute. (E.g., You will not win this 
case in court. You have a very slim chance of prevailing with 
that argument. ) 
In these examples, the mediator is stepping into the 
decisional role of a neutral expert. While this article 
focuses on legal opinions, the same analysis would apply 
/ 
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detracting from the focus on party 
responsibility for critical analysis 
and creative problem-solving; 
• An evaluation made on the basis 
of incomplete or limited information or based on inadequate 
research can be highly speculative and more likely wrong 
compared to an evaluation of a neutral specifically hired for 
that purpose; even if the evaluator is right, a subsequent 
arbitrator, judge or jury may not reach the same conclusion; 
• Evaluation focuses the outcome on the criteria used by 
a third party (e.g., legal norms) when other norms-such 
as family or religious values-may be more important to 
the parties; 
• An evaluation based in some part on information 
obtained in caucuses, without the opportunity for rebuttal 
by the other side, rests on inferior-or at least different-
evidence than the evidence that an arbitrator, judge, or 
jury would have; 
• An evaluation may end negotiations by polarizing the 
parties and entrenching their positions, in effect prolong-
ing rather than shortening disputes where the party 
favored by the evaluation becomes more entrenched and 
the disfavored party loses confidence in the mediator; 
• An anticipated evaluation will importantly affect medi-
ation representation and party negotiation, making it less 
likely that parties will be candid with one another and 
the mediator. 
In light of these dangers, one might imagine a media-
tor's opinion that disfavored Angel or her daughter, for 
example, ending negotiations, perhaps further damaging 
the already fragile family, and leading to litigation costs 
for the estate and parties that might exceed the $50,000 
that Angel, Martin, and Christophe are arguing about. 
The Mediator's Duty to Warn and 
Informed Consent 
These significant dangers suggest a duty to warn. Under 
both torts and contract theories, a mediator's failure to warn 
might be actionable. In torts, the parties' reasonable expec-
tation that the mediator will not change the agreed-upon or 
expected process absent meaningful disclosure and consent 
arguably creates a duty to warn. Negligence or malpractice 
liability could arise from a breach of this duty where there 
are damaging repercussions on the disputants' lives. Under 
contract theory, a failure to warn about a change in the 
agreed-upon process and its potential repercussions and to 
gain party consent might be a breach of either an express or 
implied term in the mediation contract. 
With respect to a party's informed understanding of 
what evaluation by a mediator means, informed consent 
is a relatively straightforward concept. Simply put, parties 
are entitled to understand what they are requesting, or 
what is being proposed by the mediator, and to be fore-
warned of dangers they might face prior to their consent-
ing to the mediator's provision of an evaluation. Once 
adequately warned, parties are deemed to have assumed 
the risk voluntarily if they consent and hence be respon-
sible for the consequences of their choice. 
What, then, constitutes consent to engage in an evalu-
ative process? Any definition of informed consent should 
be carefully crafted to describe the precise scope of the 
consent to an evaluative process. At a minimum, a party's 
consent should cover elements that current mediation 
court rules generally require when an evaluation is con-
templated, requested, or proffered. The scope of a party's 
consent should encompass a freely made, voluntary deci-
sion: ( 1) to participate in a specific type of evaluative 
process based on a clear understanding of the benefits, 
limitations, and risks associated with the process; (2) to 
be satisfied with the specifically described role of the neu-
tral and the neutral's related ethical responsibilities in the 
evaluative process; and (3) to be satisfied with the nature 
and amount of any additional fees and costs charged by 
the neutral in conducting the evaluative process. 
Principles for Adequate Disclosure 
So we arrive back at the questions: What principles guide 
mediators in providing parties with information relevant 
to the parties' consent to a mediator's changing role? 
When must a mediator obtain consent to step near (or 
over) the line into a decisional, evaluative role into what 
/ . 
Responding to a Request 
for an Evaluation 
You have asked me to give an opinion on the likely court outcome of this matter, and I am willing to do that if you both agree to my pro-
viding that service. However, you should under-
stand that at least one of you may not like my 
opinion and may feel I am no longer impartial. If 
that happens, I may be unable to assist you further 
or may be less effective as a mediator. Also, particu-
larly if you think my opinion is wrong, you may be 
disadvantaged by it in subsequent negotiations. 
While I will do my best to give you a thoughtful 
opinion, you should understand I might be wrong-
different lawyers come to different conclusions-
and my analysis will be based on information that is 
different from what a judge, arbitrator, or jury would 
hear. While I have practiced in the area of trusts 
and estates, I do not consider myself a specialist. 
Also, my opinion will be based on more limited evi-
dence than the evidence available in adjudication, 
since you have not completed discovery. In addition, 
because I have learned information in caucus and 
from confidential submissions that you have not 
heard or seen and hence cannot rebut, you must rely 
on me to separate that out from information I hear in 
joint session. 
In any case, it is very speculative to predict what 
a particular judge might do. I advise you to listen to 
your own counsel (or to get legal counsel) to inform 
you and protect your legal rights. 
Also, to the degree we focus on legal rights and 
the likely court outcome, it may distract you from 
looking for more creative solutions that might serve 
your interests better. This situation involves three 
generations of your family, and your family's values 
might be a more important basis for decisions than 
the likely legal outcome. 
Are you sure you want me to give an evaluation? 
has become known as "evaluative mediation"? 
No Surprises 
No one likes bad surprises. When expectations are low-
ered by thoughtful warnings, one tends to appreciate what 
is provided and take precautions against what might cause 
problems. Furthermore, disclosure and consent pass the 
burden of responsibility to the person who assumes the 
risk. Adequate warning will enhance a mediator's credi-
bility in that candor, and disclosure gamers trust. In addi-
tion, accurate expectations will allow attorneys to prepare 
appropriate representation plans and allow clients to 
make appropriate disclosures. 
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A Clear Description 
Any warning must indicate, with precision, the service 
being proffered and the various dangers to the mediation 
that are entailed. A mediator who begins in a facilitative 
mode and subsequently agrees to provide an evaluation 
might obtain informed consent by a statement similar 
to the boxed statement. (See Sidebar, "Responding to 
a Request for an Evaluation.") 
Early Warning 
Because the caucus strategy of the mediator, the advocacy 
approach of any attorneys, and the willingness to share 
certain types of information of parties may depend on 
their expectations regarding the role of the neutral, that 
role should be clarified at the earliest point possible. 
Often, however, it is at "final" impasse that mediators offer 
an evaluation as a last-resort impasse-breaking device. If the 
evaluation was not anticipated, then the mediator would 
simply give appropriate warnings before the evaluation is 
made-as early as possible under these circumstances. 
Two points need to be made about "final" impasse. First, 
it's not over until it's over. Determining what constitutes final 
impasse is a tricky-and perhaps illusory-affair. Parties can 
always recommence negotiations and mediation after a par-
ticular ses.sion fails to achieve resolution. Consequently, the 
warnings are in order despite the feeling that the mediator 
may not be needed again. Second, parties frequently want an 
evaluation because they believe it will be favorable to them. 
Attorneys want an evaluation because they believe it will 
make their clients more flexible or will benefit their clients. 
Evaluations, however, are likely to disappoint one (or some-
times all) of the players. Parties need clear, accurate, and rea-
sonable expectations or a disservice can be rendered. A 
mediator does not want the final act, if it is the final act, of 
the mediation to do harm. 
Standard of Care in Providing Opinions 
How careful must a mediator be in providing an opinion or 
professional advice? If there is general disagreement and 
confusion about the required scope and content of informed 
consent relative to mediator evaluation, the question of 
what standard of care applies to the evaluation mirrors that 
disagreement and confusion. Some of the various theories 
that apply to informed consent are relevant to the degree of 
care that must be exercised in providing an evaluation. 
These include tort and contract law, as discussed above. 
Under any theory, one would expect the provision of an 
opinion to be done with care. Negligence law would apply a 
"reasonableness" standard. Contract law would ask about 
the agreement or reasonable expectation of the parties. We 
add to these points some principles: 
• Always provide the basis and context of the evaluation. 
What information will the evaluation be based upon? 
What expertise does the mediator have? What research is 
being undertaken? 
• Always urge parties to get independent evaluations, lis-
ten to their own lawyers (if applicable), and consult their 
own judgment. 
.' 
14 WINTER 2008 DISPUTE RESOLUTION MAGAZINE 
• Go to the library or its electronic equivalent. That is, 
base the evaluation on a mode of thinking and conduct 
that an evaluator or opinion-giver would engage in. No 
lawyer, for example, should give an off-the-cuff opinion 
without research unless he identifies it as such and warns 
about its potential fallibility. 
For Angel, Martin, and Christophe, the evaluation and 
its quality might have a dramatic impact on their rela-
tionships going forward. Their sense of entitlement, their 
ability to live with or be influenced by a certain conclu-
sion, and their confidence in the neutral providing the 
opinion will all depend on the care that is displayed in 
the rendering of the evaluation. 
Minimizing the Risks of Evaluation 
Evaluation can be a risky move, and mediators should, as a 
baseline, do no harm in their practice. They should foster-
and not undermine-party self-determination. Ensuring 
informed consent for mediator evaluation both minimizes 
the possibility of harm and maximizes the pos.sibility of self-
determination. Put another way, parties should have a 
meaningful choice regarding whether their mediator uses 
the tool of opinion-giving and should be aware of the dan-
gers involved when they make that choice. 
When mediators do provide requested opinions, they 
should do so with care. They should consider what informa-
tion they are basing their opinion on. Is some of the "evi-
dence" unreliable? That is, was it offered in a caucus where 
the other side had no opportunity to respond? Opinions 
based on such information are more likely to be unfair. 
Mediators should, metaphorically speaking, "go to the 
library" before giving advice. They should review, take time, 
and consult professional resources that would normally be 
double-checked before a professional opinion is provided. At 
the very least, the parties should understand what the deci-
sion is based on and its qualitative difference from an opin-
ion a judge, arbitrator, or neutral expert would make. 
Ideally, Angel, Martin, and Christophe-and other par-
ties in mediation-will come away from the mediation 
process with a better understanding of one another and of 
the values that each brings to the dispute. They will feel 
that their expectations regarding the mediation process 
were honored and that the outcome of the process is a result 
of decisions that each freely made. If they requested a medi-
ator evaluation, they will have no regrets because they 
understood the downside of that process before the evalua-
tion. In short, they will have given informed consent based 
on adequate disclosures, and the evaluation will enhance, 
rather than compromise, party self-determination. • 
Note: This article is a condensed version of an article 
that appeared in the Ohio State Journal of Dispute 
Resolution in 2005: Lela P. Love and John W. Cooley, 
The Intersection of Evaluation by Mediators and Informed 
Consent: Warning the Unwary, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 45 (2005). 
